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РЕКОМЕНДУЕМ ПОСЕТИТЬ: Тематический ресурс: Продажа бильярдных столов б у, дешевые бильярдные столы



Austria-Hungary in 1914

АвторДАТА ПУБЛИКАЦИИ: 04 сентября 2007
АвторОПУБЛИКОВАЛ(а): Администратор
АвторРУБРИКА: - Imperial Russia
Источник (source)ИСТОЧНИК: http://russia.by (c)



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Did Austria-Hungary's abandonment of great-power status to concentrate on the Balkans play a major role in generating the Great War?

Viewpoint: Yes. Austria-Hungary in 1914 had become, de facto, another Balkan power, and it was correspondingly indifferent to the consequences of its actions in Europe.

Viewpoint: No. The policy of Austria-Hungary after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand reflected a determination to maintain the Dual Monarchy's status as a great power, able and willing to act independently in defense of its own vital interests.

______________________

Long described in the historiography of the Great War as a German cat's-paw, Austria-Hungary is being restored to the status of an independent actor in the diplomacy that led up to the outbreak of hostilities. Since the Bosnian Crisis (1908), the Dual Monarchy's viability was being increasingly questioned. Austria was under increasing economic pressure in the Near East even from its ostensible ally, Germany. British publicists and French diplomats pictured brave futures for the Slavs of southeastern Europe once the Habsburg Empire should disappear. The increasingly strident claims of Austria that its great-power status was being ignored went overlooked--with few questions as to what might happen should Austria not accept its assigned fate and merely fade away.
The issue sharpened as the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) established the small states of the peninsula as military powers to be reckoned with, able and willing to put more men in uniform and to spend a higher percentage of gross national product (GNP) on their maintenance than Austria had been able to consider since the days of Maria Theresa. Austria was generally understood as correspondingly unable to assert itself in the Balkans without a significant effort. Some calculations predicted that as many as a dozen corps would be required to contain Serbia and Romania in case of a general war.
Such gloomy prognostications were encouraged by a growing conviction in Vienna that Serbia in particular was determined to destroy the Habsburg Empire in pursuit of its own self-proclaimed destiny as a Balkan Piedmont and seemed responsive to nothing but force in pursuit of that policy. Pledges from Belgrade to curb subversive propaganda and similar provocations had been repeatedly shown to be nothing but scraps of paper. Great-power diplomacy proved ineffective because no one was willing to put pressure on Russia to curb its unruly client. In the aftermath of the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand it represented no concession to militarism or imperialism to decide that Austrian hawks were being justified by the course of events.
In the next six weeks, Austria-Hungary insisted repetitively that not merely prestige, not merely "vital interests" as an abstraction, were at stake; the issue was the existence of Austria as a great power. The politics of restraint are effective only when pursued from a position of strength. Given the shaky Austrian position in the international community, what Russia did or did not do was of secondary importance. Should Russia choose to support a provocation of this kind by a lesser power, it was an unmistakable statement of intention to Europe as a whole. Austria-Hungary, however, could no longer afford the luxury of making local sacrifices for the sake of a general order. The Serbian boil had to be lanced. The wider consequences of that action were accepted as beyond the control of Vienna.



Viewpoint: Yes. Austria-Hungary in 1914 had become, de facto, another Balkan power, and it was correspondingly indifferent to the consequences of its actions in Europe.

In 1914 Austria-Hungary had become a de facto Balkan power. Furthermore, it was correspondingly indifferent to the consequences of its actions after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo (28 June) for Europe as a whole. World War I became inevitable when leading Viennese statesmen determined that war be declared on Serbia in July 1914. Their goal was to put an end to the years of Great Serbian agitation that threatened the Dual Monarchy (Austria-Hungary), thus destroying the militant South Slav movement while responding aggressively to the assassination. In July Vienna was first to opt for war, indeed a Balkan War, despite the implications of that decision. Dual Monarchy leaders unanimously favored a localized war with Serbia but differed greatly on how exactly to realize it.

Throughout the prewar period (1871-1914) the Dual Monarchy lagged behind its European counterparts in their accelerated armaments race, though only the populations of Russia and Germany exceeded that of Austria-Hungary. The defense budget of the empire equaled only one-fourth that of Germany or Russia, one-third that of Great Britain or France, and even less than that of Italy.

The military weakness of Austria-Hungary would have a profound effect on Viennese foreign policy and lead to growing dependence on German support. The debilitated military position of Russia following the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905) greatly influenced the Dual Monarchy's foreign policy. Likewise, the steady military recovery of Russia presented a major dilemma to Habsburg diplomatic and army leaders throughout the Bosnian Crisis (1908-1909), the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and, specifically, during the July 1914 crisis.

As the main supporter of the dynasty and its power position, the Habsburg army was critical to maintaining unity within the empire and keeping its multinational populace kaisertreu (loyal to the emperor). After 1912, however, nationality problems, particularly the South Slav question, increasingly came to disrupt domestic, diplomatic, and military matters. The Habsburg army, deficient both qualitatively and quantitatively compared to those of the other Great Powers, required many more reservists in the event of an armed conflict. Such military shortcomings would prove potentially fatal to a multinational army.

The Balkans also served as a focal point for Viennese diplomatic relations with its German ally. The major difficulty facing Habsburg diplomats in the prewar period was inconsistent support of Germany for critical Balkan decisions. This policy became particularly manifest during the Balkan Wars. Nevertheless, regular contact among the allied Chiefs of the General Staffs, primarily in the form of written communiqués beginning during the Bosnian Crisis, continued uninterrupted. The combination of the German drive for Weltpolitik (world politics) and the Austro-Hungarian Balkan policy created the tinderbox for a European war.

The role of Germany, as perceived by Vienna, was to prevent Russian intervention in a localized Balkan military campaign. This mission was particularly important at a time when Viennese Balkan policy had been disrupted by the growth in prestige, territory, and population of Serbia as a result of the Balkan Wars. Bulgaria and Turkey, earlier buffers against Serbia, had suffered disastrous military setbacks. Equally disturbing was the apparent loss of Romania to the Triple Alliance. The position of Bucharest was paramount to the Austro-Hungarian military agenda against Russia. Its strategic function was to anchor the Habsburg right flank in a "War Case Russia." Major attention of Vienna, however, was focused on the Balkans.

An energetic Viennese foreign policy in the Balkans dating from the Bosnian Crisis depended upon the support of Berlin. In 1913 the German backing of Balkan policies led both civilian and military leaders in Austria-Hungary to assume a more aggressive stance. This policy had disastrous consequences during the July 1914 crisis.

In 1903 the Serbian royal family was assassinated, and Serbia reversed its diplomatic dependence upon Vienna. The provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, home to the majority of Serbs in the Habsburg monarchy, became magnets for the exploding Great Serb propaganda and agitation and the foci of Viennese policy. The provinces served as outposts for an active Habsburg Balkan policy and attracted expanding Great Serb propaganda and agitation.

The brutal murder of Serbian king Alexander and his wife in 1903 and the accession of the rival family to the throne by a military coup transformed Austrian-Hungarian-Serbian relations. The new Belgrade government immediately sought to emancipate itself from the shadow of Habsburg economic dominance. Suppressing this "Greater Serbia" agitation became a primary objective of Viennese policy toward Belgrade.

In Great Power relations, German policy strongly influenced the formulation of the Triple Entente, with the Dual Monarchy increasingly regarded as merely a German ally. This alliance heralded the slow demise of the Great Power status of Austria-Hungary, as it was first buffeted by unfolding Balkan events and then the realization that it could not control them.

Austro-Hungarian foreign minister Alois Aehrenthal's dynamic Balkan policy, initiated in 1906, became a core component of Viennese foreign policy, thus Balkan matters took precedent over other foreign-affairs concerns. The Bosnian Crisis, the Balkan Wars, and the July 1914 crisis can all be attributed to his forceful Balkan strategy and Vienna attempting to maintain the policy even after Aehrenthal's death in 1911.

Shortly after assuming office, Aehrenthal's energetic diplomatic efforts produced an Austro-Hungarian confrontation with Russia and Serbia, stemming from Habsburg reaction to the perceived threat of the Young Turk revolution (1908) in Turkey and its potential effect on the Balkan provinces of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Aehrenthal sought to maintain Habsburg control of the provinces. His vigorous stance was fueled by his firm conviction that the Dual Monarchy's survival hinged upon its ability to demonstrate a new dynamism. As a result, Aehrenthal pursued a foreign policy fraught with risk, as Habsburg power and prestige became fatefully intertwined with the Balkan arena in the decade before the outbreak of World War I.

Convinced annexation would bolster the Great Power status of Vienna and increase its prestige in the Balkan region, Aehrenthal grabbed the two provinces in 1908. In addition, he believed that the annexation would prevent a Serbian unification of the South Slavs in the provinces and dampen the flourishing "Greater Serbia" aspirations.

The decisive outcome of the Bosnian Crisis resulted from the military weakness of Russia following the Russo-Japanese campaign. Foremost, Habsburg-Romanov relations suffered a serious setback, ending an era of cooperation in the Balkans that was replaced by mutual suspicion and personal antipathy. Habsburg relations with Serbia also became inflamed.

Support by Berlin of Vienna during the Bosnian Crisis set a dangerous precedent in Habsburg-Hohenzollern relations. The energetic Viennese foreign policy in the Balkans increasingly became dependent on the goodwill of Germany, a further indication of the slipping Great Power situation for Vienna.

The Habsburg military leadership increasingly regarded a war with Serbia as inevitable. The first radical revision to Balkan military planning also introduced the growing possibility of Vienna facing a two-front war against both Russia and Serbia (War Case R + B). This scenario, however, presented an unsolvable military dilemma. Austro-Hungarian armies were incapable of launching successful offensives against both opponents.

Habsburg strategic military planning, ostensibly flexible as a result of the increasing danger of a two-front war, designated Serbia as a secondary foe should the far more dangerous Russia intervene militarily in a Balkan conflict. This strategy, however, did not take into account Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf 's (Chief of the Austro-Hungarian General Staff, 1906-1911, 1912-1917) personal obsession with Serbia. Indeed, though Russia posed a far greater military threat, Serbia endangered the all-important Habsburg prestige and standing in the Balkan Peninsula. Conrad gradually increased the allocation of military units to be deployed in the Balkans, at the cost of those to be utilized against Russia, to 40 percent of all troop units in the event of war.

The Balkan Wars revealed the Dual Monarchy's growing diplomatic isolation as Berlin at first displayed indifference to the perceived Balkan problems of Vienna. Thus, Count Leopold Berchtold, Foreign Minister following Aehrenthal's death, had no choice but to adopt a "wait and see" attitude at the commencement of the First Balkan War.

Vienna aggressively sought to preserve its Great Power, as well as its Balkan, position. This stance slowly came to mean utilizing a show of force, if necessary, in its diplomatic dealings in an effort to maintain waning prestige and to counter increasingly failed Balkan diplomatic efforts. As a result of the Balkan Wars, Turkey and Bulgaria, previously military counterweights to Serbia, were militarily neutralized. Romania, allied to the Triple Alliance since 1883 and projected to be a major military factor against Russia, increasingly inclined away from Viennese diplomatic leadership. The once-favorable Balkan military balance now tipped against Vienna and Berlin. Thus, during the winter of 1913 and early on into 1914 an atmosphere of apprehension hovered over Vienna and increased the belief that the very existence of the Dual Monarchy was now at stake. Its power in its "sphere of influence," the Balkans, became increasingly challenged.

Intensifying pressure to utilize the military option encouraged Viennese leaders to contemplate a military response to the escalating chronic and demoralizing South Slav situation. The use of force was deemed acceptable if it was needed to halt Serbian machinations. A new militant Habsburg attitude was rapidly forming. Both civilian and military leaders assumed a more aggressive stance. This trend produced disastrous results during the July 1914 crisis.

The role of Germany as a military ally to prevent Russian intervention in a localized Balkan military campaign became particularly important when Viennese policy was disrupted by the growth in Serbian prestige, territory, and population as a result of the Balkan Wars. The long-term results of the 1912-1913 period of cataclysmic upheaval did not bode well for Vienna. Serbia had become a potentially more powerful military power. Its ethnic brethren in the South Slavic territories made the anti-Habsburg policy of Serbia appear to be a life-or-death threat to Vienna.

The consequences of the Habsburg diplomatic moves began to materialize. For example, Romania began casting a more-covetous eye toward Transylvania. The question of maintaining loyalty to the Dual Monarchy in an age of growing nationalistic aspirations became critical to Habsburg diplomacy during 1914--a direct result of the Balkan Wars.

The three Balkan crises solidified the Viennese conviction that only forceful diplomacy, coupled with partial mobilization, threats of invasion, or the issuance of ultimatums, would be effective against a recalcitrant Serbia. Balkan policy making increasingly assumed a more-militant attitude. In just a few months the loss of prestige and self-esteem caused a shift in Habsburg diplomacy from one of caution and prudence to one of desperation, illusion, and exhaustion. Increasingly, armed force appeared to offer the only solution to the predicament of Vienna in the Balkans. This outlook set a dangerous precedent for the July 1914 crisis, as the South Slav provinces became viewed as a source of grave danger to the long-term viability of the Dual Monarchy.

In June 1914 Austria-Hungary became fixated on the more-assertive foreign policy of Russia. The following month, after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the militarized diplomacy of Vienna, ostensibly so successful on three occasions during the Balkan Wars, opted for war on the assumption that the situation would only worsen in time. Austria-Hungary concluded that the Russian and Serbian threats would better be dealt with sooner rather than later. A key factor in understanding the Viennese position in July 1914 is that they would not and could not launch a war against Serbia without German support vis-à-vis Russia, and that, once support had been obtained, Vienna could focus its full attention on preparing to launch a Balkan war that hopefully remained localized regardless of the circumstances.

Once all the leading figures had literally determined that there would be war against Serbia during the first days of July, the die was cast. On 5 July the Hoyos mission to Berlin to receive German backing proved to be successful. With their support secured, Berchtold took control over the next measures and deflected any interference. The Hoyos mission provided the key event that unleashed war.

The point to be emphasized is that, early in the July crisis, the decision to resolve the Serbian problem by a declaration of war emanated from Vienna. Once Germany issued its infamous "blank check" assuring the protection of Austria-Hungary against Russia, Vienna determined the timing and manner of future measures by cutting off any unwanted options.

In fact, by 7 July a major Common Ministerial Council had determined that Austria-Hungary would begin hostilities. Unanswered were the significant questions of "when" and "how." A final decision could not be reached because the powerful Hungarian prime minister István Tisza balked at the decision for war without careful diplomatic preparation. The next week was utilized to convince Tisza to join the other members in their determination to settle militarily accounts with Serbia.

A 19 July Ministerial Council meeting, now with Tisza's approval, agreed to issue purposely an unacceptable ultimatum to Serbia. The mandate, with a forty-eight-hour deadline to respond, was delivered on 23 July. Delivery of the ultimatum was delayed because of a meeting held between the French president and foreign minister with Russian leaders in St. Petersburg to prevent collusion.

The delivery of the ultimatum to Belgrade was accompanied by troubling reports reaching Vienna regarding Russian military measures. Habsburg leaders, nonetheless, continued to pursue their Balkan military campaign plans, hoping that a rapid invasion of Serbia would preclude Russian armed intervention. In addition, Viennese leaders anticipated that allied German support would keep St. Petersburg in line.

However, the partial mobilization was proclaimed on 25 July and the first mobilization day on 28 July, but the actual invasion of Serbia could not occur until August because of the terrible railroad situation (only one rail line led to the Serbian frontier). The diplomatic situation could not last that long. The result was disastrous military defeats on both fronts during the first campaigns.

By 1914 Austria-Hungary was fighting for its preservation. Its sphere of influence was reduced to the Balkans: the Dual Monarchy's days as a Great Power were over. The prolonged conflict of World War I sounded its death knell--and the conflict was initiated by the Austro-Hungarians all for it to remain a Balkan power!

-- Graydon A. Tunstall, University of South Florida


Viewpoint: No. The policy of Austria-Hungary after the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand reflected a determination to maintain the Dual Monarchy's status as a great power, able and willing to act independently in defense of its own vital interests.

The policy of Austria after the Archduke's assassination reflected a determination to maintain the Dual Monarchy status as a great power able and willing to act independently in defense, however ineffectively, of its own vital interests. Austria-Hungary fell to the second rank among European powers in 1866 when it was thoroughly defeated by Prussia. The Dual Monarchy nevertheless persisted in sustaining a place at the head diplomatic table through the first six months of the Great War. Emperor Francis Joseph I, ruling longer than any other monarch in the nineteenth century, tottered about his great palaces learning little but forgetting less. He was increasingly suspicious even of any new innovation such as electric lights and was correspondingly hostile to any new ideas he feared might subvert the Empire. His chief of staff in 1914, Franz Conrad von Hötzendorf, saw himself as a worthy successor to Napoleon Bonaparte as a military strategist and filled his days drafting new contingency plans for war against Serbia and Italy--his main phobias even though Italy was an ally of Austria-Hungary, at least nominally.

Serbia in particular seemed to Conrad the major immediate threat to the integrity of the empire, and he regularly sought audience with the emperor to present new reasons necessitating war against the Balkan country he saw as the focal point for south Slav nationalist aspirations. Two conflicting nationalist ideologies were increasingly pitted against each other during the nineteenth century: Germanic Kultur and Slavism. Germany, a unified country for only the past half century, was eager to prove its place as a first-ranked power not only in arms but also in every aspect of a civilized society--the arts, music, sciences, and philosophy. Accompanying this goal was a distaste for, and an atavistic fear of, the developing Slavic cultures to the east--attitudes reciprocated in Russia and the Balkans.

Austria-Hungary was caught in the middle, neither able nor willing to accept the nationalist paradigm. The Empire retained significant great-power credentials: the largest state in Europe in terms of land, not counting Russia, with a developing industrial economy and (on paper) a formidable army. Vienna was an intellectual and cultural capital of the world. Its critics described the Austro-Hungarian Empire as an anachronism among developing nation-states, founded largely on ethnic lines and depending on their inner ethnic culture to bind their social fabrics. The Habsburgs had painstakingly built their empire over 450 years, stitching together a patchwork crazy quilt of a dozen different nationalities, and even more languages, dialects, and cultural traditions. The only common denominators were the army and the emperor. The officer corps, however, identified with the empire. The rank and file proved loyal to the oaths of allegiance they swore--and to the force of habit. That loyalty was enough, in a European system that still measured the status of a state by its men under arms.

With the assassination of Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand and the identification of the killers with a terrorist organization having connections to Serbian intelligence, Conrad had the argument he needed for war against Serbia. Austria had a just cause. As much to the point, failure to act in the face of such a provocation would send an unmistakable message that the empire was as its denigrators described it: hopelessly decadent. An attack on Serbia, he argued, would not trigger a war with Russia. If it did, then Russian hostility was so great that it would only look for another excuse.

Francis Joseph I was less sanguine. At the end, however, he signed the declaration of war--some accounts say, with the phrase "also doch!" a rough Viennese-argot equivalent of "let's roll!" The phrase was apt. Even before Russia declared war, Austria-Hungary was resting the continuation of its great-power status on the ability of its army to win.

Conrad's operational plan relied on the clumsiness and slowness of Russian mobilization. He intended to take Belgrade in two weeks, then shift reserves to attack the Russian southern flank in the Polish salient. Two things went wrong, however. The Serbian army put up a more-determined and more-sophisticated fight than expected, using the broken terrain to flank Austrian attacks and eventually forcing them to retreat with losses of one hundred thousand men. Then Conrad stumbled again. Enraged by the defeat, he began to commit his reserves against Serbia--only to learn that Russian mobilization and concentration was progressing at unexpected speed. The Eastern Front was the exact opposite of the West. Instead of a cramped, crowded theater with no room for maneuver that locked armies in entrenched positions, the East allowed ample scope for moving large units. Therefore, if Conrad gave the Russians the initiative, allowing them to complete their concentrations and to choose their routes of advance, chances were excellent that his armies would be overrun in the field or trapped in the fortress systems of Lvov and Przemysl, which were unlimited vistas for maneuver. The distances, however, were also so large that the primitive air services and inefficient cavalries deployed by both armies were unable to establish enemy locations--until a division, corps, or whole field army crashed into one's own flank to great mutual surprise. Distance also meant marching up to a hundred miles into the battle zone, sending fatigued soldiers into frontal assaults, and creating problems of supply and reenforcement that became insoluble as administrative systems gridlocked. Conrad, true to his nature, abandoned his elaborately constructed prewar plans; divided his armies in the vain hope of trapping the Russians, even though he had no idea where they were or in what strength; and regarded gaps of up to seventy- five miles and little, if any, lateral communication between his subordinate armies as acceptable risks.

So they might have been--to Napoleon's Grande Armee, or the Army of Northern Virginia. Both armies blundered about in an intelligence fog, as mismatched forces lunging into each other with varied success. At first the Austrians were lucky, fighting Russian units while possessing a superiority of numbers. Then Conrad's Third Army ran headlong into the Russian main force, which outnumbered them up to three to one. Retreat turned into a general rout. In seventeen days of combat Conrad managed to lose one-third of his effectives. A typical loss rate was that of the Third Infantry Division of the XIV Corps--6,000 casualties out of a force of 10,000, almost all in the infantry, the cutting-edge arm. By the time the Austrian armies reached safety across the border, 100,000 of their men were dead, 220,000 were wounded, and more than 100,000 were taken prisoner. The material booty gained by the Russians included 216 cannons, 15,000 railway cars, and 100 locomotives.

From the first days Conrad stubbornly refused to coordinate with the Germans. The German senior officers, above all Erich Ludendorff and Conrad, held each other in mutual contempt. After regrouping, Conrad launched other offensive strikes in 1915 against both the Russians and the Serbs, but the guns of August were what broke the Austro-Hungarian army as an effective fighting force. The loss of its professional cadres was impossible to replace. Lives were sacrificed to makeup for the lack of tactical and operational skill. Loyalty diminished as casualties mounted. The army was the last claim of Austria to great-power status. Conrad expended it in three weeks and increasingly was forced to cede control of the war in the east to the Germans.

-- John Wheatley, Brooklyn Center, Minnesota


ULTIMATUM

On 22 July 1914 Austria-Hungary sent the Serbians an ultimatum that included assurances that Serbia would refrain from actions promoting the separation of provinces under Austro-Hungarian control. In addition, Serbia would be required:

1. to suppress every publication which shall incite to hatred and contempt of the Monarchy, and the general tendency of which shall be directed against the territorial integrity of the latter;

2. to proceed at once to the dissolution of the Narodna Odbrana to confiscate all of its means of propaganda, and in the same manner to proceed against the other unions and associations in Serbia which occupy themselves with propaganda against Austria-Hungary; the Royal Government will take such measures as are necessary to make sure that the dissolved associations may not continue their activities under other names or in other forms;

3. to eliminate without delay from public instruction in Serbia, everything, whether connected with the teaching corps or with the methods of teaching, that serves or may serve to nourish the propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

4. to remove from the military and administrative service in general all officers and officials who have been guilty of carrying on the propaganda against Austria-Hungary, whose names the Imperial and Royal Government reserves the right to make known to the Royal Government when communicating the material evidence now in its possession;

5. to agree to the cooperation in Serbia of the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the integrity of the Monarchy;

6. to institute a judicial inquiry against every participant in the conspiracy of the twenty-eighth of June who may be found in Serbian territory; the organs of the Imperial and Royal Government delegated for this purpose will take part in the proceedings held for this purpose;

7. to undertake with all haste the arrest of Major Voislav Tankosic and of one Milan Ciganovitch, a Serbian official, who have been compromised by the results of the inquiry;

8. by efficient measures to prevent the participation of Serbian authorities in the smuggling of weapons and explosives across the frontier; to dismiss from the service and to punish severely those members of the Frontier Service at Schabats and Losnitza who assisted the authors of the crime of Sarajevo to cross the frontier;

9. to make explanations to the Imperial and Royal Government concerning the unjustifiable utterances of high Serbian functionaries in Serbia and abroad, who, without regard for their official position, have not hesitated to express themselves in a manner hostile toward Austria-Hungary since the assassination of the twenty-eighth of June;

10. to inform the Imperial and Royal Government without delay of the execution of the measures comprised in the foregoing points.

Source: "23 July, 1914: The Austro-Hungarian Ultimatum to Serbia, English Translation," World War I Document Archive, Internet website, http://www.lib.byu.edu/~rdh/wwi/1914/austro-hungarian- ultimatum.html.

FURTHER READINGS


References


Ludwig Bittner and Hans Uebersberger, eds., Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegausbruch 1914: Diplomatische Aktenstücke des österreichisch-ungarischen Ministeriums des Aussern, nine volumes (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag, 1930).

Fritz Fellner, "Die 'Mission Hoyos,'" in Deutschlands Sonderung von Europa, 1862-1945, edited by Wilhelm Alff (Frankfurt & New York: Peter Lang, 1984).

Imanuel Geiss, ed., July 1914: The Outbreak of the First World War; Selected Documents, translated by Henry Meyric Hughes and Geiss (London: Batsford, 1967).

Hugo Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold: Grandseigneur und Staatsman, two volumes (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1963).

Conrad von Hötzendorf, Aus Meiner Dienstzeit, 1908-1918, five volumes (Vienna: Rikola Verlag, 1921-1925).

John Leslie, "The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary's War Aims," in Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, 20 (1993).

Leslie, "Österreich-Ungarn vor dem Kriegsausbruch. Der Ballhausplatz in Wien im Juli 1914 aus der Sicht eines österreichisch-ungarischen Diplomaten," in Deutschland und Europa in der Neuzeit: Festschrift fur Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by Ralph Melville and others (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner Verlag, 1988).

Manfred Rauchensteiner, Der Tod des Doppeladlers. Österreich-Ungarn und der Erste Wel,tkrieg (Graz: Verlag Styria, 1993).

Gunther E. Rothenberg, The Army of Francis Joseph (West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1976).

Graydon A. Tunstall Jr., Planning for War Against Russia and Serbia: Austro-Hungarian and German Military Strategies, 1871-1914 (Boulder, Colo.: Social Science Monographs; New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).

Samuel R. Williamson Jr., Austria-Hungary and the First World War (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 1991).

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